Preliminary findings from the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and  Actions (GHVA) Survey by Ahmed, Eliza
 Preliminary findings from the
Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and
Actions (GHVA) Survey
Eliza Ahmed
WORKING PAPER 66 • MAY 2005
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE 
GRADUATES’ HOPES, VISIONS  
AND ACTIONS (GHVA) SURVEY 
 
Eliza Ahmed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Tax System Integrity 
Research School of Social Sciences 
Australian National University 
Canberra, ACT, 0200 
 
ISBN 0 642 76866 8 
ISSN 1444-8211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER No 66 
May 2005 
 
 ii
Centre for Tax System Integrity, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University 2005 
 
Commonwealth of Australia 2005 
 
 
 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication data: 
 
 
Ahmed, Eliza. 
Preliminary findings from the Graduates' Hopes, Visions 
and Actions (GHVA) survey. 
 
 
Bibliography. 
ISBN 0 642 76866 8. 
 
1. Educational surveys - Australia. 2. College graduates - 
Australia - Attitudes. 3. College costs - Australia.  
I. Centre for Tax System Integrity. II. Title. (Series: 
Working paper (Centre for Tax System Integrity); no. 66). 
 
 
378.380994 
 
 
 
 
If you would like to make any comments on this working paper please contact the author 
directly within 90 days of publication. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
This article has been written as part of a series of publications issued from the Centre for 
Tax System Integrity. The views contained in this article are representative of the author 
only. The publishing of this article does not constitute an endorsement of or any other 
expression of opinion by the Australian National University or the Commissioner of 
Taxation of the author's opinion. The Australian National University and the 
Commissioner of Taxation do not accept any loss, damage or injury howsoever arising that 
may result from this article. This article does not constitute a public or private ruling within 
the meaning of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, nor is it an advance opinion of the 
Commissioner of Taxation. 
 iii
THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
This report presents basic descriptive results from the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and 
Actions (GHVA) Survey conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity in 2000. The 
GHVA Survey consisted of eight parts, each designed to measure graduates’ attitudes and 
opinions towards the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), the Australian 
Taxation Office (Tax Office) and the tax system. Specific areas of interest were graduates’ 
views of HECS as a policy, their course and degree they obtained, the Tax Office, the 
Australian tax system and their taxpaying behaviour. The Survey was also designed to 
obtain graduates’ views on a select set of policy implementation issues.  
 
Of the 1500 questionnaires distributed, 447 completed surveys were returned, giving a 
response rate of 33%.  
 
This report is divided into two sections: Section 1 briefly describes the background of the 
GHVA Survey. It also presents the method of sampling and data collection, including 
response rates and sample representativeness. Section 2 explains what is being measured in 
each part of the Survey, and highlights important findings.  
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Preliminary findings from the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions (GHVA) Survey 
 
Eliza Ahmed 
 
Introduction 
 
The Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions (GHVA; Ahmed, 2000b) Survey was 
conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) in 2000. The Survey consisted of 
eight parts, each designed to obtain a snapshot of the beliefs, attitudes and motivations held 
by a sample of Australian graduates who recently received their university degrees. 
Specific areas of interest were graduates’ views of the Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme (HECS), their courses and degrees they obtained, the Australian Taxation Office 
(Tax Office), the Australian tax system and their taxpaying behaviour. The Survey was 
also designed to obtain an overview of graduates’ understanding of current policy and 
practice about HECS. 
 
The current report is divided into two sections: Section 1 provides a background to the 
GHVA Survey. It also describes the method of sampling and data collection, including the 
follow-up processes, response rates, and sample representativeness.  
 
Section 2 explains what is being measured in each part of the Survey, and highlights 
important findings. Where the findings have already been developed through further CTSI 
working papers, they are briefly mentioned. 
 
SECTION 1: 
Background 
 
In 1973-74, tuition fees in the Australian universities were abolished for those who met the 
academic criteria for admission. Just over a decade later in 1987, the Whitlam 
government’s policy of free tertiary education was reversed with the first steps taken to a 
user-pays system. The introduction of the Higher Education Administration Charge 
(HEAC) in 1987 opened the door for the implementation of a student loan scheme, HECS, 
in 1989. The major purpose of the implementation of HECS (developed by Professor 
Bruce Chapman, Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian 
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National University) was to assist students who wished to pursue higher education, but 
who could not afford upfront student charges. The scheme allows university students to 
accumulate a debt that is repayable through the tax system once they enter the workforce 
and their income exceeds a threshold level. The threshold has been increased and 
decreased over the years, with accompanying public debate about what is a fair threshold 
and what is not.  
 
More than a decade after the implementation of HECS, it remains controversial (AVCC 
Higher Education News, 2003; Chapman & Ryan, 2002; Gittens, 2003). There has recently 
been considerable public and media discussion (for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 
April 1, 2003; Financial Review, February 21, 2004) of the consequences of the 
implementation of HECS. 
 
An analysis by the Individual Non Business (INB) sector of the Tax Office shows that a 
HECS liability impacts on tax non-compliance in areas such as lodgment. As estimated in 
1996, 3.3% of individuals with a HECS liability required an intervention (for example, a 
demand letter, penalty or prosecution) by the Tax Office, compared to 2% of those without 
a HECS liability. Data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey showed that 
citizens with a HECS liability were less likely to comply with their tax obligations (Ahmed 
& Braithwaite, 2004).  
 
Against this background, it appeared necessary to expand our understanding of how 
carrying a government debt for higher education affects the taxpaying behaviour of 
individuals. Therefore, the GHVA Survey was designed to conduct a more focused inquiry 
into the issue of tax non-compliance among graduates. Of particular interest were the 
questions: Why did these taxpayers feel disinclined to repay the debt that they had 
incurred? And was there empirical evidence to support anecdotal accounts (Ahmed, 2000a) 
of graduates holding a resentful attitude toward the Tax Office as well as the Australian tax 
system?  
 
The funding of tertiary education is a highly politicised issue in Australia. It has been 
argued that the government should pay for higher education because university education 
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is important to Australian economic growth (for example, Canberra Times, February 19, 
2004). At the same time, others put forward that because citizens with a university 
education are rewarded in the labour market by higher earnings, they should bear the cost 
of their own education (The Age, May 21, 2003). While the debate itself is critically 
important and should be encouraged in the best democratic tradition, the consequences for 
citizenship behaviours also warrant attention. The purpose of the current research was to 
better understand graduate discontent about HECS, and its consequences for the Australian 
society in general. 
 
There were six steps (see Table 1) involved in the GHVA Survey with the aim of giving 
Australian graduates a say on HECS. 
 
Table 1: Research steps in the GHVA Survey 
Research steps 
Step one: 
 Pilot study with a convenient sample 
 Focus groups at university sites 
Step two: 
 Data analyses 
 Report on pilot study and focus group discussion (http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/researchnote7.pdf)  
Step three: 
 Designing the main research 
 Development of the GHVA Survey questionnaire 
 The GHVA Survey mail out and follow-up 
Step four: 
 Data entry from the GHVA Survey 
 Data analyses 
Step five: 
 Writing up the GHVA Survey results 
Step six: 
 Presenting the GHVA Survey results to CTSI Third International Research 
 Conference and to Continuing Professional Development sessions at 5 different Australian 
 Taxation Offices  
 
Methodology 
Pilot study 
 
A pilot study was carried out by the Centre for Tax System Integrity during June-July in 
2000. The primary aim of this pilot study was to obtain a snapshot of the beliefs and 
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attitudes toward the HECS held by a snowball sample (N = 30) of Australian graduates 
who recently received their degrees. Data were collected primarily through structured 
questionnaires and personal interviews. Focus group discussions were also held to 
capture detailed information on issues concerning HECS. A report (Ahmed, 2000a) on 
the findings obtained from the pilot study can be viewed at 
(http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/researchnote7.pdf).  
 
Main study 
 
Data for the main GHVA Survey were collected between August and October 2000. New 
Australian graduates whose degree was conferred formally at graduation ceremonies in 
either 1998 or 1999 were selected for this study. Survey questionnaires were sent to home 
addresses collected from publicly available electoral rolls kept in microfiche form. Many 
graduates could not be located as they did not update their addresses on the electoral roll. 
However, the names and addresses of 1500 graduates were located from the electoral roll. 
The sample was stratified in terms of students graduating from each discipline in two 
universities in the Australian Capital Territory.  
 
Non-respondents were followed up using a number of subsequent mailings. Participation 
was voluntary. To promote honesty in self-reporting, it was emphasized that the Survey 
was anonymous and that answers would remain confidential. It was also emphasized that 
the research was conducted by the CTSI at the ANU, and that the Tax Office would not 
have access to any individual taxpayers’ survey responses.  
 
Data collection and follow-up processes 
 
Participants were initially sent an introductory letter explaining the intent of the Survey, 
emphasizing the voluntary nature of participation, and guaranteeing strict confidentiality of 
responses. The introductory letter explained that the purpose of the Survey was to 
understand how graduates viewed HECS, how they felt about their tertiary education 
experiences, and how they would describe their taxpaying behaviour.  
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After one week, the Survey questionnaire was sent along with an accompanying letter and 
a postage-paid return envelope. The accompanying letter emphasized the research purpose 
once more, re-iterating the guarantee of respondent anonymity, and encouraging 
respondents to return the completed questionnaire in a sealed envelope. A two-week return 
date was requested. An identification number appeared in the questionnaire to allow 
follow-up reminders to be sent to non-respondents asking them to complete and mail the 
Survey if they had not already done so. As recommended by Dillman (1991), a reminder 
postcard was sent out one week after the initial mailing. Three weeks later, an identical 
packet was sent out to those participants who had not returned the questionnaire. This 
process was chosen to ensure a reasonable response rate for survey of this kind, where 
people are reluctant to be forthcoming.  
 
Response rates 
 
A total of 447 completed surveys were received by the end of October 2000. Of the 1500 
questionnaires distributed, 447 were returned after several reminders, giving a response 
rate of 33% (after allowing for undelivered questionnaires and ineligible respondents). This 
response rate, while low in absolute terms, is comparable with rates reported for other tax-
based surveys (Braithwaite, 2000; Pope, Fayle, & Chen, 1993; Kirchler, 1999; 
Wallschutzky, 1996; Webley, Adams, & Elffers, 2002). Wallschutzky (1996) has argued 
that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected to yield higher than a 30 to 
40 percent response rate. 
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Table 2: Number and percentage of responses to the GHVA Survey, categorized by 
class of response 
Class of response Number 
Unadjusted 
percentage 
Adjusted* 
percentage 
Drawn sample 1500 100.0  
Completed surveys 447 29.80 33.01 
Out-of-scope 
return to sender 
Refusals 
127 
19 
  8.47 
  1.27  
Not completed 907 60.46 66.99 
* Adjusted percentage is based on number of questionnaire distributed minus out-of-scope questionnaires 
 
 
Sample representativeness 
 
The sampling method was a convenience sample primarily drawn from the Australian 
Capital Territory (84% resided in the ACT), and hence, representativeness of the sample 
needed to be ascertained. 
 
The final section of the GHVA Survey contained socio-demographic questions so as to 
establish the extent to which the sample reflected the graduate population. The best available 
comparative database available to us came from the Graduate Destination Survey (Career 
destinations of University of Southern Queensland graduates, 2001). 
 
It was found that 59% of the respondents to the GHVA Survey were female and 41% were 
male. These figures are very close to the national graduate population (58% female and 
42% male) and to the GDS (62% female and 38% male) (see Long & Hillman, 2000; 
Appendix D, p. 44 for both sets of figures). 
 
The mean age of the current sample was 31.39 years, suggesting that the GHVA Survey 
over-represented mature students. The current sample has 38% of graduates within the age 
range 25-29 compared to 16% in the GDS. 
 
In terms of the discipline studied, 33% respondents studied arts, education, and nursing, 
very close to the GDS report (33.9%). The proportion of respondents who studied science, 
engineering, and agriculture (41%) was also close to the GDS report (47%). However, 
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graduates from law, medicine, and veterinary science seem to be under-represented in the 
sample (6%) compared to the GDS sample (19.4%). This may be because the sample was 
drawn from ACT universities where most of the health sciences (for example, medicine, 
veterinary science) are not offered.  
 
The mean personal income of the current respondents falls in the category of $30 000-
$50 000 which is comparable with the GDS statistics of an average annual income of 
$45 000 for full-time employed graduates (Career destinations of USQ graduates, 2001; 
http://www.usq.edu.au/resources/2002+usq+career+destinations+report+-
+section+1+and+2.pdf).  
 
In terms of HECS debt, the GHVA Survey data showed that 35% of respondents paid 
upfront as opposed to deferring payment (65%). Data reported in an earlier study (Kim, 
1997) estimates upfront payments at 26%. The GHVA Survey seems to over-represent 
those who paid upfront. With regard to the breakdown of full-time and part-time students 
who paid upfront, the GHVA’s percentage was 22% for full-time students which closely 
matches results (21%) derived from Kim’s study. 
 
When comparisons are made in terms of the type of attendance in university courses, the 
GHVA sample seemed closely representative of the GDS sample. For example, 71% of the 
GHVA graduates studied full-time compared to 74% for the GDS graduates. 
 
Thus, a comparison of the current sample with the GDS sample shows that the current 
sample appears to be representative in terms of gender, personal income and type of 
attendance. However, the sample appears to over-represent those aged between 25-29 
years, part-time students, and those who paid upfront payments. It appears to under-
represent graduates who studied health sciences. These findings should be considered 
when interpreting the survey results.  
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SECTION 2: 
 
The GHVA Survey (www.ctsi.anu.edu.au) included a range of question items designed to 
measure views on HECS, attitudes towards the Tax Office as well as the tax system, 
experiences of university courses, perceived deterrence, shame management, and social 
values. It also included a wide range of compliance questions in relation to repaying a 
HECS debt and taxpaying behaviour. Finally, respondents were asked about a selection of 
demographic and background variables.  
 
This report provides a descriptive account of the main quantitative findings. Some 
qualitative data were collected through the use of two open-ended questions at the end of 
the GHVA Survey. These are now being sorted and analysed in an effort to summarize the 
main themes that emerged from the compilation of graduates’ comments (for example, 
Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2003).  
 
It is beyond the scope of this report to describe the social-psychological mechanisms that 
play a significant role in compliance among this particular group of taxpayers, and hence, 
interested readers are referred to other working papers and articles for this information. For 
example, an in-depth analysis of the inter-relationships among policy discontent (in 
relation to HECS), university course experiences, having a HECS liability, tax morale, 
shame management, and tax evasion is provided elsewhere (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2004; 
Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2003; Braithwaite & Ahmed, 2004). 
 
Part I: Discontentment, unfairness, and moral obligation in relation to HECS 
 
In Part I of the GHVA Survey, respondents were asked the extent to which they perceived 
HECS as being a fair and reasonable social policy. The questions tapped into feelings of 
discontent with HECS as well as beliefs that thresholds, discounts, and differential HECS 
rates were unfair. In addition, questions were posed about moral obligation to repay their 
HECS debts. 
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Using a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree), respondents were asked 
to indicate whether they would agree or disagree with statements about the themes listed 
above. 
 
Table 3: Respondents’ views on HECS as a policy 
Policy discontent items Percentage 
who agreed1 
People are not satisfied with the HECS 64 
People are very resentful about repaying a HECS debt  59 
The HECS favours the rich over the poor 49 
When I think about repaying a HECS debt, I feel as if I am 
losing out 
39 
There are more negatives than positives in the HECS 38 
In general, I don’t think of the benefits – I just see the 
HECS as taking money from my pocket 
31 
The HECS should be abolished 29 
*In general, the HECS is a fair system 51 
*The HECS is functioning very well as it is 40 
 
Policy discontent 
 
From Table 3, it can be seen that 64% of the respondents were discontented with the 
scheme. This discontent is also clear in the findings that 59% of the respondents resented 
repaying their HECS debt.  
 
When asked about a specific equity policy in HECS, 49% of the respondents expressed 
their discontent in affirming that HECS favoured the rich over the poor. Discontent about 
HECS also appeared in a number of a follow-up questions (see Table 3). Among these, 
38% of respondents viewed more negatives than positives in the HECS, 39% expressed a 
feeling of losing out when thinking about repaying their HECS debt, and 31% viewed 
HECS as taking money from their pocket, and supported the abolition of the scheme 
(29%). 
 
In spite of this frustration and dissatisfaction among graduates, it appears that about half of 
the respondents (51%) thought of HECS as a fair system in general. When asked about its 
                                                           
1 This includes ‘Slightly agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly agree’. 
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functioning, far less than half of the respondents (40%) agreed that the HECS is 
functioning well as it is. 
 
These nine items were averaged to construct the policy discontent variable (M = 3.40; 
SD = 1.21; alpha reliability = 0.94). The importance of policy discontent in predicting tax 
morale and tax evasion is reported in Braithwaite and Ahmed (2004), and in Ahmed and 
Braithwaite (2003), respectively. 
 
HECS as an unfair policy in its detail 
 
Respondents were also asked about three aspects of HECS that have been perceived as 
discriminatory, and sparked hot debate in previous years. As seen from Table 4, 63% of 
respondents perceived HECS as unfair because the threshold level for compulsory payment 
had been lowered, 55% perceived it as unfair that the scheme has differential rates for 
different courses, and 47% perceived it as unfair because it gives a 25% discount to upfront 
payers.  
 
Overall, the findings from Table 3 and Table 4 reveal that although most graduates are not 
in favour of abolishing HECS, they perceived that HECS was discriminately unfair 
amongst people. In particular, graduates deferring HECS payments compared to those who 
paid upfront are more likely to perceive HECS as an unfair policy (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 
2004). 
 
Table 4: Respondents’ perception of the HECS as an unfair policy 
Perceived unfairness items Percentage 
who agreed2 
‘Recently3, the threshold level for compulsory payment of a HECS 
debt was lowered’ – this is unfair 
63 
‘Differential rates of HECS apply to commencing students 
depending upon the type of course (for example, medicine, science) 
undertaken’ – this is unfair 
55 
‘Students who pay upfront are eligible to have a 25 percent discount 
rate’ – this is unfair 
47 
 
                                                           
2 This includes ‘Slightly agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly agree’. 
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Moral obligation in repaying a HECS debt 
 
In Part I of the GHVA Survey, respondents were also asked about their perceived moral 
obligation to repay their HECS debt. Eight statements were used and findings about the 
percentage of those who agreed are reported in Table 5.  
 
The vast majority of the respondents viewed repaying their HECS debt as a moral 
obligation. As evident in Table 5, 94% of respondents believe that repaying their HECS 
debt is the right thing to do and is their responsibility, and 80% of the respondents agreed 
that they should repay the HECS debt and share in the cost of education. 79% were 
disappointed that some graduates do not repay their HECS debt and 73% thought that the 
community loses because of non-repayment. 
 
Respondents were also asked about the consequences of failure to repay their HECS debt 
to capture the degree to which they felt a responsibility to future students. About two-thirds 
of the sample expressed concern that non-repayment harms the prospects for future 
students of pursuing higher education. Failure to repay spoils things for future students, in 
the opinion of 65% of respondents, whereas 61% respondents viewed failure to repay as a 
violation of the right of future students.  
 
Table 5: Respondents’ views on repaying their HECS debt as a moral obligation 
Items Percentage 
who agreed4 
Repaying a HECS debt is the right thing to do 94 
Repaying a HECS debt is a responsibility 94 
One should repay the HECS debt and share in the cost of providing 
education 
80 
It’s disappointing that some graduates do not repay their HECS debt 79 
The community loses benefit because some graduates do not repay their 
HECS debt 
73 
Graduates who do not repay their HECS debt spoil things for future 
students 
65 
Repaying one’s HECS debt ultimately advantages future students 64 
Not repaying the HECS debt is violating the right of future students 61 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 Note that the survey was conducted in 2000.  
4 This includes ‘Slightly agree’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly agree’. 
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A measure of moral obligation in relation to repaying HECS debt was constructed by 
averaging the above 8 items. This variable (M = 4.28; SD = 1.06; alpha reliability = 0.92) 
was used in predicting tax morale in Braithwaite and Ahmed (2004). In a comparison 
analysis, graduates deferring HECS payments compared to those who paid upfront are 
found to have a lower internalised obligation to repay the loan (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 
2004).  
 
Part II: Deterrence and shame management in relation to compliance 
 
Part II of the GHVA Survey presented respondents with a hypothetical scenario designed 
to test the central propositions of deterrence theory (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990) and shame 
management theory (Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2001). 
 
Deterrence theory 
 
Deterrence theory suggests the importance of sanctions in obtaining tax compliance. 
Deterrence, in this study, was measured through scenario-based questions that capture the 
following three concepts: perceived probability of getting caught, perceived probability of 
receiving legal sanction, and perceived consequences. The scenario used in the GHVA 
Survey asked respondents to imagine that they had been caught for not repaying their 
HECS debt: ‘Imagine that you chose to defer payment of your HECS debt and you are now 
required to repay the debt through the taxation system. You DO NOT repay the debt.’ 
 
At first, respondents were asked to indicate what they thought the chances were that they 
would get caught for not repaying their HECS debt. From Table 6, it is interesting to note 
that the mean of perceived probability of getting caught was far higher among graduates 
(4.31) than for the general population (3.42). The mean of perceived probability of legal 
sanctions was also higher among graduates (4.01) than general taxpayers (3.96). However, 
the mean of perceived consequences (that is, problems posed by getting caught and 
sanctioned) was lower among graduates (3.23) than general taxpayers (3.51).  
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Table 6: Mean responses (standard deviations are in the parenthesis) to 
deterrence questions5 for not repaying a HECS debt 
Source of deterrence Current 
sample 
General 
population6 
Probability of getting caught  4.31 
(0.85) 
3.42    
(1.05) 
Probability of legal sanctions [(fine + debt you owe with 
interest) and (debt you owe with interest)] 
4.01 
(0.88) 
3.96      
(0.98) 
Perceived problem posed by getting caught and being 
sanctioned  
3.23 
(0.85) 
3.51      
(0.71) 
 
The above findings suggest that deterrence at the level of being caught and sanctioned is 
working reasonably well among the graduate population. The graduates expressed more 
concern about being caught and facing legal consequences than general taxpayers. 
However, less scores on ‘perceived problem posed by getting caught and being sanctioned’ 
by graduates calls into question the meaning of deterrence for this group. Given that 
graduates, in general, have relatively new relationships with the Tax Office, they were 
expected to perceive the problem of legal consequences as more serious than other 
taxpayers. The most plausible explanation seems to lie in their feelings of dissatisfaction 
about HECS and/or their university degrees. When graduates are resentful towards HECS 
as a policy or they are dissatisfied with their returns on their educational investment, they 
fail to acknowledge shame when they are asked to imagine themselves not repaying their 
HECS debt and being caught. In other words, they feel as if it would not be a problem for 
them if they were caught. This issue has been developed in Ahmed (2004), and Ahmed and 
Braithwaite (2003). 
 
Shame management 
 
In this part of the Survey, the same scenario was used to measure shame management 
strategies among graduate respondents. According to shame management theory, those 
who are prepared to cooperate with HECS will acknowledge that it is wrong and shameful 
to cheat the system because they are unhappy with it. Those who resist HECS will blame 
                                                           
5 Perceived probability of getting caught, perceived probability of legal consequence, and perceived problem 
posed by getting caught. 
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others for being caught cheating the system, and dismiss their shame feelings by 
trivializing HECS arrangements. 
 
Using the same scenario stated above, respondents were asked: ‘Assume that you now 
have to pay a substantial fine or penalty. How likely is it that the following would occur?’ 
Respondents are then presented with a list of shame related reactions, following Ahmed’s 
(2001) Management Of Shame State – Shame Acknowledgment and Shame Displacement 
(MOSS-SASD; for details see Ahmed, 2004), which they rate in terms of their relevance to 
them using four categories: 1 = not likely, 2 = may happen, 3 = likely, 4 = almost certain. 
For the full listing of items comprising shame management scales, see Ahmed (2004). 
 
Based on the validation work by Ahmed (2004), three separate scales were constructed: 
Shame acknowledgment, Shame displacement, and Shame avoidance. Shame 
acknowledgment represents adaptive shame management whereby a person acknowledges 
wrongdoing, takes responsibility for wrongdoing, and seeks to make amends (a sample 
item: feel ashamed of myself; 9 items in total). 
 
Shame displacement represents a shame management strategy which indicates an inability to 
manage shame without blaming and hitting out at others (a sample item: feel angry with the Tax 
Office; 3 items in total). 
 
Shame avoidance also represents a maladaptive shame management strategy whereby the 
wrongdoer denies feelings of shame and expresses a rejection of a decision imposed by an 
authority (a sample item: pretend that nothing was happening; 2 items in total).  
                                                                                                                                                                                
6 This data is from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey (Braithwaite, 2000) where respondents 
were asked to imagine being caught for (a) not declaring income (Scenario 1); and (b) falsely claiming work 
deductions (Scenario 2).  
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Table 7: Mean ratings of shame management scales 
MOSS-SASD scales Mean SD Alpha 
Shame acknowledgment 2.54 (3.06) 0.89 (0.81) 0.95 (0.95) 
Shame displacement 1.77 (1.84) 0.71 (0.72) 0.82 (0.90) 
Shame avoidance  1.47 (1.46) 0.58 (0.62) 0.66 (0.87) 
Note: Figures in brackets represent responses given to tax evasion scenarios (see footnote #6) by the general 
taxpaying community (Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns, & Graham, 2001) 
 
Table 7 presents the key descriptive findings of the three shame management scales. From 
a law enforcement perspective, it is encouraging to know that most people were likely to 
acknowledge shame and were unlikely to displace shame and to avoid shame after having 
received a penalty for tax evasion. It is of note that both shame displacement and shame 
avoidance were maladaptive strategies, but shame avoidance had a lower mean (M = 1.47) 
compared to shame displacement (M = 1.77).  
 
Shame avoidance is hypothesized as being different from shame displacement in the 
following way: shame displacement represents projecting blame onto the authority whereas 
shame avoidance represents a reaction of dismissiveness to the legal breach and to 
authority. Therefore, shame avoidance seems to be a more crucial risk factor for tax 
systems. The fact that it has a lower mean than shame displacement is reassuring for policy 
administrators. Yet it is of note that the graduate population, compared to the general 
population, had a lower mean for the shame acknowledgment scale.  
 
Factors that contribute to shame acknowledgment, shame displacement, and shame 
avoidance, and the roles these shame management strategies play in tax evasion have been 
discussed elsewhere (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2003; Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2004).  
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Part III: HECS and taxpaying behaviour 
 
Part III of the Survey asked graduates questions about their HECS liability and its 
repayment. The main focus of this part was to capture compliance issues in relation to both 
HECS repayment and taxpaying behaviour. 
 
HECS administration and compliance  
 
The data showed that 35% of respondents paid upfront as opposed to deferring payment 
(65%). Among those who claimed to pay upfront, 67% made the full payment whereas 
33% chose the partial upfront payment option. Of those who had paid upfront, 65% 
reported that they were self-funding, 25% that their parents paid for them, and 10% that 
employers paid for them. Readers should be cautious in interpreting these figures because 
the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a respondent’s upfront payment 
can be made by parents at first, then by the student, and finally by the employer. 
 
Three questions in this part of the GHVA Survey were designed to capture whether any 
system error was present in collecting HECS. The importance of this kind of query arose 
out of the pilot study (Ahmed, 2000a). In a series of focus-group discussions, it became 
evident that although some graduates noted in their employment declaration form that they 
were accumulating a HECS debt, employers did not deduct additional tax instalments for 
their debt. A comment from one participant in the pilot is given below: 
 
Despite notifying my employers that I have a HECS debt and filling out the 
appropriate form, often this information is lost. The consequence of this is that I 
have not been taxed the additional amount during the year and end up having 
underpaid tax at the financial year. A lump sum must then be paid at the end of the 
year … 
 
To investigate the issue of system or administrative error in the HECS administration, three 
questions were posed (see Table 8). Although 97% of respondents declared to their 
employer that they were accumulating a HECS debt, only 82% said that their employer 
deducted additional payments for their HECS debt. This discrepancy confirmed the pilot 
study findings, but the size of the discrepancy was greater than expected. Further research 
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is needed to explain these results. Perhaps the 97% declaration figure is an exaggeration of 
the true state of affairs. Respondents may not have wanted to admit failure to declare the 
debt to their employer. It is of note, however, that at least 9% were willing to admit to late 
tax returns and exaggerating deductions (see Table 9).  
 
Table 8: Responses to compliance questions in relation to HECS debt 
Compliance questions Yes (%) 
Did you declare in your Employment Declaration that you had a 
HECS debt? 
97 
Does your employer know that you have a HECS debt? 97 
Does your employer deduct additional tax instalments for your 
HECS debt? 
82 
 
Tax compliance 
 
Part III also measured the degree to which graduates comply with the Tax Office’s 
demands, using a number of different items measuring taxpaying behaviour. The items 
measure the extent to which the respondents admit to having engaged in act(s) of tax non-
compliance.  
 
Table 9: Responses to compliance questions in relation to paying tax 
Tax compliance  GHVA Survey 
Yes (%) 
CHFA Survey 
Yes (%) 
Have you any income tax returns not yet completed from 
previous years? 
9 5 
Did you lodge an income tax return for the past financial 
year? 
90 80 
Did you declare all your untaxed cash income on your 
recent income tax return? 
57 75 
Did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in 
your recent income tax return? 
9 10 
 
From Table 9, it can be seen that the GHVA Survey respondents, compared to the general 
population surveyed in the CHFA Survey, were more likely to have uncompleted tax 
returns from previous years. This result may reflect the fact that for a period, some 
graduates did not have to lodge a return because their income was too low. In a further 
analysis, it was found that 37% of the graduates reported having had their jobs for less than 
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two years. This explanation becomes more acceptable when 90% of the graduates reported 
having lodged an income tax return for 1999-2000 financial year. This is, in fact, a higher 
proportion (80%) than the general population surveyed in the CHFA Survey. It is 
encouraging to know that the results for the item ‘Did you exaggerate the amount of 
deductions or rebates in your recent income tax return?’ were very close for participants in 
both surveys. 
 
A somewhat surprising result was the finding that 57% of the graduates, compared to the 
75% of the general population, had declared all their untaxed cash income on recent 
income tax return. This result was surprising given that the above account of lodgment and 
exaggeration figures were very comparable to the figures obtained from the general 
population. This needs further exploration. 
 
Questions in Part III also captured respondents’ personal experiences with the Tax Office. 
The questions covered whether respondents had ever been queried to check the accuracy of 
their tax return, whether they had any outstanding debt with the Tax Office (apart from 
HECS debt), whether they had reported all the money they earned in the 1999-2000 tax 
return, whether they had ever been fined or penalized by the Tax Office, whether they had 
ever been investigated by the Tax Office, whether they had ever contested an assessment 
given by the Tax Office, whether they had ever requested information from the Tax Office, 
and whether they had ever requested general information about the tax system from the 
Tax Office. 
 
As can be seen in Table 10, respondents from the GHVA Survey reported far fewer 
experiences with the Tax Office in most respects. This is what one would expect since the 
respondents sampled in the GHVA Survey were recent graduates and only recently had 
commenced employment. The results also show no differences between populations in 
terms of having an outstanding debt and requesting general information about the tax 
system from the Tax Office. 
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Table 10: Respondents’ reported experiences with the Australian Taxation Office 
Reported experience GHVA Survey 
Yes (%) 
CHFA Survey 
Yes (%) 
Has the Tax Office ever asked questions to check the 
accuracy of your tax return? 
11 18 
Do you have any outstanding debt with the Tax Office? 
(not including HECS debt) 
4 3 
Have you ever been fined or penalized in some way by 
the Tax Office? 
6 15 
Have you ever had an audit or other investigation by the 
Tax Office?   
8 18 
Have you ever contested an assessment given by the Tax 
Office? 
6 15 
Have you ever requested information about your tax 
situation from the Tax Office? 
18 29 
Have you ever requested general information about the 
tax system from the Tax Office? 
42 41 
 
Following Ahmed and Braithwaite (2004), three of the above items were used to develop 
the behavioural index of tax evasion. To form the index of tax evasion, respondents were 
grouped as evaders if they had evaded tax in any one of the following ways: 
 
(1) how much of your income in the 1999-2000 financial year did you get paid in 
untaxed cash? (that is, notes and coins rather than cheque or directly deposited into 
a bank account) (less than 5% = 1, between 5 and 20% = 2, between 20 and 50% = 
3, more than 50% = 4, did not get paid any untaxed cash = 5) 
and 
 how much of your untaxed cash income did you declare on your 1999-2000 
 income tax return? (none = 1 through all = 10); or 
(2) As far as you know, did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in your 
1999-2000 income tax return? (a lot = 1, quite a lot = 2, somewhat = 3, a little = 4, 
not at all = 5); or 
(3) As far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your 1999-2000 
income tax return? (yes = 1, no = 2). 
 
If a respondent indicated that they were totally compliant on all of these three indicators, 
they were assigned to the non-evader group. Thus tax evasion was scored as 1 if non-
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compliant on at least one indicator and 0 if compliant on all three indicators. It was found 
that 20% of the respondents were involved in tax evasion. Importantly, graduates deferring 
HECS payments were more likely to engage in tax evasion compared to those who paid 
upfront (Ahmed, under review; Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2003). 
 
Part IV: Attitude toward the tax system and Australian Taxation Office 
 
The issue of how graduates see the Australian Taxation Office and think of their own 
payment of personal income tax was assessed in Part IV.  
 
Motivational postures 
 
Ten statements were used to measure motivational postures, that is the ways graduates 
position themselves in relation to the tax system, and/or the Tax Office (for details, see 
Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson, & Makkai, 1994). A 5-point Likert scale was used with 1 
representing strong agreement and 5 representing strong disagreement with the statement. 
 
In the taxation context, Braithwaite and Reinhart (2000) have identified five kinds of 
motivational postures: commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement, and game-
playing. The two postures that represent cooperation with the demand of the debt collector 
are commitment and capitulation. The items in the commitment posture measure the extent 
to which people feel that taxpaying is their responsibility and is the right thing to do. The 
items in the capitulation posture measure the extent to which people repay debt to avoid 
trouble with debt collectors.  
 
There are three more postures that represent non-cooperation with the demands of the debt 
collector. These are resistance, disengagement and game-playing. Taxpayers who adopt a 
resistance posture are adopting an adversarial position toward the tax law. Instead they are 
likely to view the Tax Office with doubt and antagonism. As can be seen from Table 11, the 
postures of disengagement and game-playing represent a greater relational  
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Table 11: A comparison of graduate and the general population on their 
motivational postures in relation to the Australian Taxation Office / tax system 
Items/variables GHVA Survey 
Yes (%) 
CHFA Survey 
Yes (%) 
Commitment   
Paying tax is the right thing to do 93 86 
Paying tax is a responsibility that should be willingly 
accepted by all Australians 
92 87 
Capitulation   
Even if the Tax Office finds that I am doing something 
wrong they will respect me in the long run as long as I 
admit my mistakes 
14 36 
The Tax Office is encouraging to those who have 
difficulty in meeting their tax obligations through no 
fault of their own 
19 37 
Resistance   
The Tax Office is more interested in catching you for 
doing the wrong thing than helping you do the right 
thing  
33 39 
It’s impossible to satisfy the requirements of the Tax 
Office completely 
20 31 
Disengagement   
I don’t care if I am not doing the right thing by the Tax 
Office 
7 5 
If I find out that I am not doing what the Tax Office 
wants, I’m not going to lose any sleep over it 
25 17 
Game-playing   
I enjoy the challenge of minimizing the tax I have to 
pay 
36 22 
I like the game of finding the grey area of tax law 11 12 
Note: Figures in the Table represent ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly agree’ categories. 
 
distance than the resistance posture. They show a dissociation from the debt collector 
which goes far beyond resisting authority. Disengaged taxpayers do not care that they are 
not doing the right thing whereas taxpayers who adopt a game-playing posture enjoy the 
challenge of competing with the authority. Both these groups appear to have withdrawn 
their cooperation from the Tax Office either through advocating not paying tax or through 
becoming dissociated from the tax system. As can be seen from Table 11, most findings 
are comparable to the findings obtained from the CHFA Survey. However, the results 
reveal a slight trend for the GHVA Survey participants to adopt more commitment but less 
capture and resistance in relation to the Tax Office / the Australian tax system. The results 
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also indicate that the GHVA Survey respondents scored higher on the following two items 
in relation to disengagement and game-playing: (1) If I find out that I am not doing what 
the Tax Office wants, I’m not going to lose any sleep over it; and (2) I enjoy the challenge 
of minimizing the tax I have to pay.  
 
Both disengagement and game-playing postures represent the kind of stance that enables 
citizens to cut themselves off from the demand of an authority and successfully challenge 
the authority. When citizens adopt these postures, it is called dissociation (Braithwaite, 
2004), that is, they transcend the authoritative position of the Tax Office. Following 
Braithwaite, a measurement scale ‘Dissociation’ that represents a readiness to sidestep the 
constraints of the tax system was created using three items: (a) ‘I like the game of finding 
the grey area of tax law’; (b) ‘I don’t care if I am doing the right thing by the tax office’; 
and (c) ‘I enjoy the challenge of minimizing the tax I have to pay’.  
 
Reciprocity and obligation in relation to paying tax 
 
In the next part of the Survey, additional questions were posed to capture respondents’ 
reciprocity and obligatory attitudes toward paying tax. Again, a 5-point Likert scale was 
used, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5), with ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ as the middle choice. 
 
It is interesting to observe in Table 12 that a vast majority of the respondents answered yes 
to all these question items. 
 
A measure of tax morale was constructed by averaging eight items from Part VI. The items 
are: (1) Paying tax is the right thing to do; (2) Paying tax is a responsibility that should be 
willingly accepted by all Australians; (3) Citizenship carries with it a duty to pay tax; 
(4) Citizenship carries with it a shared responsibility between Government and citizen; 
(5) I believe paying tax is good for our society, and therefore it is good for each of us; 
(6) It’s disappointing that some people do not pay their tax; (7) It makes difficult to govern 
the country when people don’t pay their tax; and (8) The harm to the community through 
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people not paying tax is regrettable. This variable (M = 4.10; SD = 0.54; alpha reliability = 
0.86) has been used as an outcome variable by Braithwaite and Ahmed (2004).  
 
Table 12: Respondents’ attitudes toward obligatory aspects of paying tax 
Items Yes7 (%) 
I should pay tax and share in the cost of providing health care 90 
I should pay tax and share in the cost of providing defense for 
the country 
79 
I should pay tax and share in the cost of building national 
highways 
88 
Citizenship carries with it a duty to pay tax 88 
Citizenship carries with it a shared responsibility between 
Government and citizen  
91 
I believe paying tax is good for our society, and therefore it is 
good for each of us 
80 
It’s disappointing that some people do not pay their tax 90 
It makes difficult to govern the country when people don’t pay 
their tax 
74 
The harm to the community through people not paying tax is 
regrettable 
75 
 
Part V: Social values 
 
Part V of the Survey was designed to collect information on the degree to which the 
sample of graduates supported the values in the Social Goals and Values Survey 
(Braithwaite, 1982). Using a 7-point scale (1 = Reject to 7 = Accept as of utmost 
importance), graduates were presented with a number of social values, and were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they accepted or rejected them as principles to guide their 
judgments and actions. Five items were averaged to construct the security values scale 
(Mean = 5.16; SD = 0.94; alpha reliability = 0.79) and ten items were averaged to construct 
the harmony values (Mean = 5.86; SD = 0.77; alpha reliability = 0.91) scale. 
 
Security values represent the importance of law and protecting resources within one’s 
group, and include goals such as national greatness, national security and rules of law. 
Harmony values represent those principles that aim to share resources in the society, 
communicate mutual respect among citizens, and cooperate to allow individuals to develop 
                                                           
7 This includes ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly agree’.  
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their full potentials. As found previously, most respondents were in favour of accepting 
both kinds of social values as guiding principles of their life. When compared to the 
general population, it appears that the CHFA Survey respondents have a slight tendency 
toward higher security values (Mean = 5.64; SD = 0.97) but lower harmony values (Mean 
= 5.72; SD = 0.84).  
 
Both value orientations are considered relevant to building tax morale and for 
understanding tax compliance. Both security and harmony values have been used to predict 
tax morale in Braithwaite and Ahmed (2004). 
 
Part VI: Course satisfaction  
 
This part of the Survey focused on respondents’ feelings of satisfaction with their higher 
education. A pilot study (Ahmed, 2000a) uncovered particular resentment about carrying a 
HECS debt when they do not receive the quality of education to succeed in their chosen 
career.  
 
Most items used in this scale were adapted from the Graduate Experience Questionnaire 
(Long & Hillman, 2003). There were six response categories for all items in this measure: 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = 
strongly agree.  
 
Seventeen items comprising the measure covered four aspects of university experience: 
(a) skill acquisition (4 items; a sample item: The course helped me develop the ability to 
plan my own work; M = 4.62; SD = 0.79; alpha = 0.81); (b) professional development8 
(7 items; a sample item: The course helped me to grow professionally; M = 4.17; SD = 
0.92; alpha = 0.86); (c) quality teaching (4 items; a sample item: My lecturers were 
extremely good at explaining things; M = 3.62; SD = 1.06; alpha = 0.89); and (d) clear 
goals (2 items; a sample item: It was often hard to discover what was expected of me in 
this course (reverse coded); M = 3.73; SD = 1.09; alpha = 0.68). Because these four scales 
were significantly and positively interrelated (the correlation coefficients ranged from 0.26 
to 0.51, p < 0.001), they were combined to measure respondents’ satisfaction with higher 
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education. Findings in relation to course satisfaction in predicting tax morale, dissociation 
from the tax system, and tax evasion have been reported in Ahmed and Braithwaite (2003) 
and Braithwaite and Ahmed (2004). 
 
In a comparison analysis (Ahmed & Braithwaite, in progress), it is evident that graduates 
deferring payments are less satisfied with their university experiences compared to those 
who paid upfront. This means, graduates who are yet to pay back to the government are 
less satisfied with the quality of teaching in terms of (a) the staff’s ability to explain the 
subject, to motivate students, and to provide helpful feedback on progress of the students; 
(b) the professional quality of the course they studied; and (c) the overall goals and 
standards in the course they studied. 
 
Due to the absence of some items (from the Graduate Experience Questionnaire) in the 
GHVA survey, valid comparisons between surveys have not been possible. However, a 
cross-tabulation was performed to determine whether responses on three course 
satisfaction scales (skill acquisition, quality teaching, and clear goals) differed across 
attendance mode and gender. In the breakdown of the responses on these scales by 
attendance mode (full-time vs. part-time) and gender (male vs. female), no significant 
differences were found. These results are closely matched with those derived from the 
survey conducted by Monash University, Australia 
(http://www.planning.monash.edu.au/statistics/ceq/ceq2000.pdf). 
 
Part VII: Opinions on how government implements HECS 
 
Respondents were asked seven questions relevant to nationwide policies on HECS and 
taxation.  
 
When asked whether they would like ‘a snapshot’ on what the government was doing with 
the money they pay under HECS, 52% of the respondents strongly agreed with the 
proposition while 36% thought it was a good idea. Only 12% expressed no need for ‘a 
snapshot’.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
8 This aspect was developed for the present study. 
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Table 13: Percentage of responses to the information provider on HECS 
Information provider Which of the following 
provided you with useful 
information about HECS? 
Which is the most useful way 
to receive necessary 
information concerning 
HECS? 
Secondary school 1.9 12.8 
Tax Office school visit - 6.0 
University open day 6.6 10.0 
Student administration 26.5 30.0 
Tax Office information 
booklet 
38.0 32.0 
Media (website) 7.0 7.0 
Family / friends 13.1 0.2 
Other 6.8 2.0 
 
When asked about where the graduates received useful information about HECS (see Table 
13), 38% of the respondents answered the Tax Office’s information booklet followed by 
student administration (27%), family friends (13%), media (7%), university open day 
(7%), others (6%), and secondary school (2%).  
 
When asked about their opinion on what would be the most useful provider, there is 
support for new ways of providing information on HECS. Apart from re-affirming the 
importance of student administration and university open day, the respondents gave the 
greatest weighting to secondary school (13%). Most importantly, 6% of the respondents 
commented that the Tax Office’s school visit was an effective provider of useful 
information about HECS.  
 
From Table 13, it can be seen that the Tax Office did not make any school visits in earlier 
years according to our respondents. Tax Office school visits accustom students to 
appropriate taxpaying behaviour at an important time in their lives, when many of them are 
starting their first job and when some are about to engage with the Tax Office through their 
dealings about HECS. This may be the most appropriate time for training about what is 
required for a responsible taxpayer and a valuable opportunity to provide clear information 
about the purpose and operation of HECS.  
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Table 14: Respondents’ views on policy relevant questions in relation to HECS 
Items % of respondent who 
answered yes9 
How useful would it be for you to get an explanation for 
the benefits of repaying the HECS debt quicker? 
78 
Are you well informed about what you need to do in order 
to repay your HECS debt? 
84 
Have you felt that you are missing out on information 
about what you can legitimately claim as a tax deduction? 
79 
How much do you support the idea of exposing people 
who deliberately cheat the tax system (for example, 
publishing names of those who deliberately evade tax in 
the Tax Office annual report by the Commissioner)? 
65 
 
Respondents were asked whether they would find it useful to have an explanation about the 
benefits of repaying their HECS debt quicker. As seen from Table 14, 78% of respondents 
(this includes responses on ‘a lot’, ‘quite a bit’, ‘somewhat’ and ‘a little’) answered that 
they would find it useful, compared to only 22% who said ‘not at all’.  
 
When asked whether they were well informed about what they needed to do in order to repay 
their HECS debt, only 12% of the respondents said ‘not at all’. The majority, 84% of the 
respondents, said that they were well informed in this regard (see Table 14). When asked 
about whether they felt that they were missing out on information about what they could 
legitimately claim as a tax deduction, 79% reported that they felt they were missing 
information (this includes responses on ‘a lot’, ‘quite a bit’, ‘somewhat’ and ‘a little’) whereas 
21% said ‘not at all’. These findings highlight the need for information through proper 
channels to help those entering the workforce after their tertiary study to make responsible 
decisions about tax deduction. 
 
When asked about whether respondents support the idea of exposing people who 
deliberately cheat the tax system through publishing names in the Tax Office annual report, 
65% (this includes responses on ‘a lot’, ‘quite a bit’, ‘somewhat’ and ‘a little’) supported 
the idea of exposing tax evaders, leaving 35% who responded no (Table 14). When 
compared graduates who carry a HECS debt and those who do not, an interesting finding 
                                                           
9 This consists of ‘a little’, ‘somewhat’, ‘quite a bit’, and ‘a lot’. 
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emerged. Graduates deferring HECS payments were in less favour of exposing tax evaders 
as a form of shaming (Ahmed & Braithwaite, in progress).  
 
Public shaming has already come up as a compliance response strategy for the Inland 
Revenue Department in New Zealand. The Department for Courts in New Zealand has 
published names of fine defaulters in major newspapers. As reported, the outcome was that 
a good number of defaulters started to pay their full fine and/or to make arrangements to do 
so (http://www.courts.govt.nz). 
 
Part VIII: Background information  
 
The final section of the GHVA Survey asked a number of background questions, such as 
the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics.  
 
As Table 15 demonstrates, 41% of the respondents were male and 59% were female. The 
overall average age of respondents was 31.39 years. When examining their type of higher 
education attendance, 71% attended full-time whereas 29% attended part-time. In terms of 
labour force status, 60% were employed in non-profit organizations, 25% were employed 
in the private sector, 9% were in the business sector (including self-employed), and 5% 
were in the ‘other’ category.  
 
In terms of the studied discipline, 41% were in ‘Science, engineering, agriculture, 
architecture, business/economics’, 35% were in ‘Arts, education, nursing’, 18% were in 
combined degrees, and finally, 5% were in the ‘Law, medicine, veterinary science’ 
category. 
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Table 15: Information on respondents’ socio-demographic background from 
GHVA Survey 
Demographic variables Responses 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
41% 
59% 
Age 
24 and younger  
25 to 29 years  
30 to 39 years 
40 to 54 years 
55 and older 
 
24% 
38% 
17% 
17% 
3% 
Discipline studied 
Arts, education, nursing 
Science, engineering, 
agriculture, architecture, 
business/economics 
Law, medicine, veterinary science 
Combined degrees 
Other 
 
35% 
41% 
 
 
5% 
18% 
0.5% 
Financial circumstances affecting 
choice of course (yes) 
choice of university (yes) 
type of attendance (yes) 
 
12% 
31% 
37% 
Type of attendance (full-time) 71% 
Job description 
Non-profit organizations (for 
example, university, government) 
Private 
Business 
Other 
 
60% 
 
25% 
9% 
5% 
Personal income Under $20,000 =   9% 
20,001 to 30,000 = 10% 
30,001 to 50,000 = 56% 
50,001 to 75,000 = 20% 
$75,001 to $100,000 =   3% 
Over $100,001 =   2% 
 
When asked about whether financial circumstance affected their choices of career, 12% 
reported that their choice of course was affected, 31% reported that their choice of 
university was affected, and 37% reported that their choice of enrolment (full-time/part-
 30
time) was affected. In spite of HECS, therefore, students appear to trade off their tertiary 
education against their financial circumstances. 
 
Finally, the average personal income of the current respondents falls in the category of 
$30 000 - $50 000. One finding confirms what is known about the gender wage gap at the 
national level (National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling (NATSEM), 2001). 
Significantly more females were earning below $50 000 whereas significantly more males 
were earning above $75 000. 
 
While results obtained from this Survey have advanced our understanding of tax 
compliance, some limitations should be mentioned. Care should be taken in generalizing 
from the findings to include graduates from other states. One potential problem associated 
with the mail-out survey is the possibility that the internal validity of results can be 
jeopardized through selective non-response. Non-response may have affected the 
representativeness of the data.  
 
These shortcomings, however, are not unique to this survey. In providing this summary of 
findings, we invite others who have conducted similar surveys to make comparisons on 
key variables. Through processes of replication and triangulation of findings, we can come 
to a better understanding of how graduates from Australian universities are responding to 
the HECS and how these responses affect taxation compliance.  
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